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In our opinion

Who really ran Pueblo?

The more we learn about the Pueblo incident, the more it seems no one was in charge.

The Navy did not anticipate direct troubles with the Koreans, off whose shore the Pueblo patrolled to monitor electronic signals. The skipper of a sister ship refused even to have small machine guns, such as the Pueblo carried, put on his vessel because they "might be provocative."

Leaks and hints from secret testimony indicate strongly that Capt. Bucher of the Pueblo and his crew were involved strictly in a transportation operation. The multi-million dollar electronic gear, top secret, that was aboard was operated and managed by a force that he did not directly command and, indeed, was not cleared to inspect.

Exactly what his responsibilities were in connection with the spy ship's spy work have not been made clear in the testimony that is public up to this time.

The more or less hands off attitude adopted by Capt. Bucher's superiors in the ship-operating Navy, as opposed to the intelligence-gathering Navy, or CIA, or whatever

the outfit was, indicates also that the Navy felt itself a transporter, not an operator of the mission. The Navy happens to work on the sea and a sea going platform was required for the secret work. Was that the Navy's only direct duty in the incident?

It is totally unlike the Navy to send even a canoe out without detailed operating, communications and contingency instructions. The typical Navy operations order includes every imaginable detail, plus some that could only come up on sixth Monday of the month.

Our reading of the incident, plus perusal of details that have slipped out from the hearings, thus raises doubt as to whether this was a Navy operation at all. The responsibility seems to move out of the Navy's chain of command to other areas.

Whatever, the cat's out of the bag now and the responsibility should be placed. U.S. sailors have a right to whether they are being needlessly exposed without backup forces to protect them and whether Navy policy or some hush-hush apparatus holds their lives in its hands.

Pueblo Skipper's *152-Minute Ordeal*

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

CORONADO, Calif.—The legal fate of Cmdr. Lloyd M. Bucher of the USS Pueblo hangs on the way the Navy interprets three words in its regulations: "power to resist."

In two weeks of testimony before five admirals sitting here as a naval court of inquiry, Bucher has contended he did not have the power to resist the North Koreans who snatched his ship away on the high seas Jan. 23, 1968.

So far, his story of how he became the first skipper in more than 150 years to surrender his ship without firing a shot has held up well. But starting Monday, the court will hear from other members of the 83-man crew and there have been rumors, though only rumors, that some of Bucher's officers did not want to give up the Pueblo. Bucher is confident, however, that his crew will back him up by agreeing that there was no choice.

Navy regulation 0730 states: "The commanding officer shall not permit his command to be searched by any person representing a foreign state nor permit any of the personnel under his command to be removed from the command by such person so long as he has the power to resist."

"Cmdr. Bucher," his attorney, E. Miles Harvey, asked in court, "at the time the North Koreans set foot on your ship, did you any longer have the power to resist?"

"No, I did not," Bucher replied.

What follows is Bucher's own story of his 152-minute ordeal. The unattributed quotations are his.

“AT ABOUT 1200 [noon] or a few minutes thereafter, we sighted the SO-1,” a North Korean subchaser. QM 1/c Charles B. Law Jr. said that “we were between 15 and 18 miles from the nearest land, Ung Do Island. We were laying to, attempting to collect electronic intelligence.”

The subchaser circled the Pueblo at a range of 500 to 1000 yards, giving the spy ship a thorough scrutiny. The Pueblo was flying no American flag at the time. Its white numbers, GER-2, had not been painted out.

“After a minute of circling, the SO-1 asked, ‘What nationality?’, through the international code of signals flag hoist. My response to this signal was to hoist the U.S. flag, my ensign. And I noticed a great deal of activity aboard the SO-1.

“I expected that we might have this SO-1 for company for the remainder of the time that we would be in the area and that he would perform in the same manner as other ships that had tailed me on several of her missions . . . I

did, however, plan to report the incidents, particularly in view of the fact that all of his guns were manned. But I figured that this was nothing more than harassment and something that was intended to intimidate me, and to intimidate the ship.”

A Scientific Guise

TO DISGUISE the Pueblo's real purpose and also to assert its rights to the high seas, Bucher had raised the flags on his ship indicating that hydrographic operations were under way. He also ordered the oceanographer to conduct a Nansen cast: heaving over the side a string of bottles attached to a cable. The bottles are opened after the weighted line hits the bottom; they fill with water at various depths and take its temperature.

“The SO-1 hoisted the international code signal, ‘Heave to or I will fire’ . . . I was already lying dead in the water . . . I answered back, ‘I’m in international waters.’ This exchange took place on the SO-1's third circle of the Pueblo. The subchaser was flying pennant No. 35.”

At 12:10 p.m., according to a radio message intercepted by U. S. intelligence, the North Korean subchaser radioed its superiors: “The name of the target is GER-2. I judge it to be a reconnaissance ship. It is American guys. It does not appear that there are weapons, and it is a hydrographic mapping ship.” The subchaser had seen the hydrographic flags.

At 12:52, the Pueblo radioed its superiors at U. S. Naval Forces Japan (headquartered at Yokosuka). Air Force Lt. Gen. George Brown, who looked into the Pueblo incident for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress last February that the Pueblo's 52-minute delay in reporting the “heave to” order “indicates that she wasn't particularly disturbed by this challenge.” Bucher testified that he raised the precedence of his 12:52 p.m. message from “flash” to “critical,” “which would permit the message to go immediately and straight to the White House in addition to all the addressees.”

He had an open radio line to Japan at the while, in contrast to the previous day, when he said it took him 12 to 14 hours to make contact with his home command.

AT 1 P.M. Korean time, the sea-going game of chicken in international waters off Wonsan escalated. Three North Korean torpedo boats, armed with machine guns as well as torpedoes, sped from the direction

of Wonsan to join the subchaser harassing the Pueblo—still dead in the water. The torpedoes were still in their covers but the deck guns were manned. Also, Bucher said, two Korean fighter planes, which he believed were Mig-21s, circled overhead.

“The P-4s (torpedo boats) closed and stationed themselves around the ship at a range of between 50 and 100 yards, sometimes getting in as close as 25 yards . . . Attempting to man my 50-caliber machine guns and breaking out my 45s (pistols on board) would only have given them perhaps an excuse to turn from what might be glossed over into a full-blown incident.”

Apparently unknown to Bucher at the time, U.S. intelligence had intercepted a 1:06 p.m. message from the subchaser to shore that she intended to board the Pueblo and tow her into Wonsan.

“I never considered that I would ever be attacked on this mission. It never occurred to me. I had read nothing, nothing in the many Banner reports, and I believe that there were ten of them. Nor had I received any briefings at any station along the way during my period as prospective commanding officer or after I was commanding officer—and the many briefings I received from people at CINCPAC Fleet (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet) and in Japan—that would indicate that there was any danger of my ever coming under attack.”

Koreans Converse

THE SUBCHASER sent another signal which Bucher translated as: “Follow in my wake. I have a pilot aboard.” The subchaser and one of the PT boats conferred by semaphore and megaphone after this signal went up, apparently deciding how to force the Pueblo to follow them into Wonsan. PT boat No. 4 then backed toward the starboard bow area of the Pueblo with a boarding party on deck.

“I said on the bridge (when he saw the boarding party coming toward the Pueblo), I would be damned if they were going to get away with that, so I got under way and proceeded out to sea, and asked the navigator for the best course to open land . . . He recommended 080 . . . As I was departing the area, I also hoisted a flag with the intention of confusing the SO-1: ‘Thank you for your consideration. I am departing the area.’ I should have filled my yardarm with flags that said absolutely nothing and let them fiddle around for some time . . . I thought just sending them something would cool them off a little bit.

“I started off at one-third speed in order to leave the area in as dignified a way as I possibly could. I did not want to appear to be panicky . . . I went at one-third speed in order to present a dignified departure from a rather tight situation.”

By using right full rudder as he got under way, Bucher broke up the initial boarding attempt. A second subchaser came on the scene and then left, but the PT boats stayed with him. A fourth had come on the scene. They kept

close in on the Pueblo—one on each bow and one on the stern. The PT boats made a wide circle and headed out toward deep water.

Bucher had ordered his crew to prepare to destroy classified material aboard. "I didn't know but that I might be able to get away by running out to sea. I still had not been fired upon. . . I did not consider that I had enough positive information as to what was going to happen eventually. . . that I should order emergency destruction at that time."

"I was able to open the SO-1 to a range of something between 2000 and 3000 yards before she did anything else. I was, however, being constantly harassed by the P-4s. The one P-4 which was on my starboard quarter was the only P-4 to uncover a torpedo tube and train it in my direction. Otherwise, I was merely being held under the sights of the machine guns, which were deck mounted.

"The SO-1 was still lying back and was getting farther and farther behind me. About the time we had opened the range to him to approximately 3000 yards. . . he opened on my port quarter in order apparently to gain a tactical advantage of being able to bring his guns to bear on at least as much of my ship as possible. . .

"He was running at a speed of 20 to 25 knots in order to close me. As he commenced closing, he raised the signal again: 'Heave to or I will fire on you.' I ignored this signal and continued to run at full speed. . ."

'Request Help. SOS'

AT 1:27 P.M., as U.S. intelligence officers were to report later, the North Korean sub chaser ordered the four torpedo boats to get out of the way so she could fire at the fleeing Pueblo. At 1:28 p.m., the Pueblo radioed: "The North Koreans plan to open fire. . . Initiating emergency destruction of classified equipment. Request help. SOS."

This was the message that Rear Adm. Frank L. Johnson's headquarters back in Japan was to find itself unable to respond to for lack of ships or planes in the right place.

"At a range of 1500 to 2000 yards, the SO-1 opened up on me and fired the first salvo. Each salvo contained between six and 14 individual shells."

Some of the PT boats—Bucher said he did not know how many—were firing away at the Pueblo at the same time with what he guessed were 30-caliber machine guns. "I could see the dents being made as the machine guns raked the side of the ship, but very few of those penetrated."

One of the shells from the first salvo of 57-millimeter (Bucher judged they were that size) exploded near Bucher on the flying bridge. The fragments wounded Bucher. Signalman 1/c Wendell G. Leach and Communications Technician 3/c Steven J. Robin—all of whom were on the bridge.

The explosion knocked Bucher down. He had one painful fragment in his buttocks and seven more in his ankle area. But none of the men was put out of action by his wounds. Bucher said he got back up on his feet and ordered the destruction of the classified equipment.

AFTER THE first salvo was fired, the PT boats continued to open the coast on a course of approximately 080, although I had come slightly to the right and was perhaps at that time on a course of about 100 degrees in an attempt to place the SO-1 more directly astern of me in order that I would present as small a target angle as possible. He continued to open to the east and, having much greater speed than I had, he was able to position himself once again out on my port quarter. . .

"After about the third salvo, it occurred to me that most of the firing was being directed toward my flying bridge. . . The SO-1 had closed by this time to a range of approximately 900 yards on my port quarter. . . He was continuing to close and therefore was firing at what I would consider a point-blank range."

Bucher said he therefore decided to go down to the pilot house by an exposed ladder on the starboard side. A torpedo boat 40 yards off the starboard quarter spotted him and opened fire. The bullets missed him. Leach and Robin, rather than risk that fire, jumped down from the flying bridge to the pilot house level.

Problem of Destruction

BUCHER HAD ordered a modified general quarters—ordering all his men except those burning secret papers to stay off the decks and inside the ship where the machine gun bullets could not reach them. The torpedo boats had forced him away from his seaward course to a bearing more toward land of 140 degrees. He said this kept him from getting to 600-foot-deep water, the required depth for dumping classified equipment over the side.

He said he was worried about everybody getting killed or the ship being sunk in shallow water—alternatives which would have given the Koreans the secret equipment largely intact. He said he decided to stop his "high-speed" run to see if the firing would stop so his crew could concentrate on destroying secret equipment. He raised the flags protesting the firing and brought the Pueblo to a full stop under the guns of the sub chaser and four PT boats.

"We continued to destroy classified material" while the ship was stopped. The firing had stopped as well. "I decided at that time that if the destruction of classified material was progressing successfully, and depending upon what their next action would be, that I would surrender the ship."

Pistols Over Side

AFTER LEAVING the pilot house to make sure no secret papers were there, and throwing his personal pistols over the side so the Koreans would not get them, Bucher said he went back up to the bridge. The sub chaser was lying to about 800 yards away from the Pueblo. It had hoisted the signal, "Follow me, I have a pilot aboard." This was apparently about 1:40 p.m.

At 1:45 p.m., the Pueblo radioed to shore that "we are being escorted in probable Wonsan." Bucher said he followed the sub chaser as slowly as possible to buy maximum time to destroy secret equipment. The sub chaser

was 200 yards ahead of the Pueblo. The PT boats surrounded the Pueblo close in, motioning Bucher to speed up. He said he pretended not to understand and kept going at one-third speed.

Once again Bucher became worried about whether the classified material would be destroyed before the Pueblo tied up at Wonsan. He stopped the ship again to buy time. A torpedo boat radioed the Pueblo's all-stop to the sub chaser. It returned to a range of 2000 yards and opened fire again. One shell from this salvo hit Fireman Duane D. Hodges in the right hip, practically blowing his leg off and destroying much of his lower stomach region. Hodges died from his wounds.

"It became apparent to me at this time, and it was my considered opinion, that to continue to remain stopped as I was would only invite additional firing and would in all probability give us less of an opportunity to complete the destruction which was going on at the time. So I ordered the ship ahead one-third. . . and we continued to follow the SO-1 in."

This second stopping of the Pueblo was probably between 1:45 and 2:10 p.m., because it was in that interval that the ship radioed to Japan: "Have three wounded and one man with leg blown off. Have not used any weapons nor uncovered 50-caliber machine guns. Destroying all (deleted from public transcript) and as much electrical equipment as possible. How about some help? These guys mean business. Do not intend to offer any resistance."

Bucher kept following the sub-chaser into Wonsan. He was ordered to stop at 2:32 p.m. It was apparently at this time that the North Koreans boarded the Pueblo. It was still in international waters, even outside the 12-mile limit claimed by North Korea—according to Navy officials. At 5 p.m., the Pueblo was still 6½ nautical miles outside Wonsan Harbor.

Bucher estimates that the North Koreans tied his ship up in Wonsan about 8:30 p.m. Destruction of classified materials had not been completed.

WASHINGTON POST
3 FEB. 1969

Bucher Tried Coffee 'Break'

CORONADO, Calif. Feb. 2 (AP) — Cmdr. Lloyd Bucher hurled a coffee cup at a North Korean gunboat coming alongside the USS Pueblo, a close friend disclosed today.

Shortly before the intelligence ship was captured, Bucher grabbed the cup from the bridge and flung it across a small chunk of the Sea of Japan.

"It was a study in frustration," said Lt. Cmdr. Alan Hemphill, who once served with Bucher.

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both can say with pride that we have contributed to the building of a better country.

Your dedication and hard work over the past 33 years have been exemplary. You have exhibited a combination of talents which mark few individuals. That you channeled those talents to serving your fellow citizens is all the more admirable.

I extend to you my sincere appreciation for the job you have done. May you be equally successful in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

NORTH KOREA'S SAVAGERY BARED

HON. JOHN M. ASHBROOK

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 30, 1969

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, a little over 15 years ago a Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations issued a report titled, "Korean War Atrocities." The report stated in part:

The evidence before the subcommittee conclusively proves that American prisoners of war who were not deliberately murdered at the time of capture or shortly after capture, were beaten, wounded, starved, and tortured; molested, displayed, and humiliated before the civilian populace and/or forced to march long distances without benefit of adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, or medical care to Communist prison camps, and there to experience further acts of human indignities.

The report further observed:

Communist massacres and the wholesale extermination of their victims is a calculated part of Communist psychological warfare. The atrocities perpetrated in Korea against the United Nations troops by Chinese and North Korean Communists are not unique in Communist history, nor can they be explained away on the grounds that inhumanity is often associated with so-called civilized warfare.

The ordeal of Comdr. Lloyd Bucher and his men illustrates graphically that the Communists of North Korea still employ the weapon of terror to reach their ends just as the Soviet Union did in its August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

David Lawrence, the nationally syndicated columnist, strikes the same theme in his column, "North Korea's Savagery Bared," which appeared in the Washington Post of January 27:

Training in how to torture prisoners is part of a Communist technique and has long been used to frighten citizens who show the slightest signs of disobeying the edicts of the dictatorship regime.

The mistreatment of the *Pueblo's* men is but the latest in a long list of cases which prove beyond reasonable doubt the basic inhumanity of communism. It is one of the greatest enigmas of our times that men in high places can still treat Communist regimes as though they belonged to that circle of free and respectable nations throughout the world.

I insert the above-mentioned column by David Lawrence in the Record at this point:

NORTH KOREA'S SAVAGERY BARED

The North Korean government stands before the world today as guilty of brutality

and savagery in the treatment of the crew taken from the American naval ship *Pueblo*, and held as prisoners for 11 months. Behind this regime are the Communist governments in Moscow and Peking.

Will nations which believe in humanitarianism—even when they take into custody individuals from enemy forces—allow the incident to go unnoticed? Will the protests come from far and wide so that the principles of civilized practice in dealing fairly with prisoners will be widely publicized?

Why do the Communist governments tolerate vicious tactics by their own puppet states? Do they think that they themselves escape responsibility?

The story told by Comdr. Lloyd M. Bucher last week to a naval court of inquiry might have been regarded as commonplace in the jungles of Africa. But most of the people throughout the world have hitherto assumed that the Soviet government would not have permitted the men who manage its enslaved countries to risk the worldwide publication of the way Communists sometimes handle prisoners.

The Communist extremists believe in torture, and they exact "confessions" for the purpose of publicity and propaganda. One thing that would frustrate such tactics would be for the United States government to announce that any Americans hereafter seized by the Communists anywhere have been authorized to "confess" or admit anything they are asked to say by their captors. This would render these documents immediately valueless as propaganda, and perhaps would save prisoners from such cruelties as the *Pueblo's* crewmen experienced.

But it wasn't only the American sailors who were subjected to the savage and inhumane ordeals. A South Korean who had previously been taken prisoner was strapped to a wall, after having been tortured. He was shown to Comdr. Bucher, who testified last week as follows:

"He was alive. But he had been through a terrible ordeal. He had a compound fracture of the arm and the bone was sticking out. He had completely bitten through his lower lip. . . . It was hanging down. His right eye had been put out. His head was hanging down and a black substance from the put-out eye was dripping down.

All this was done to warn Comdr. Bucher what might be his own fate and that of his crewmen. He had already been close to death with a revolver at his head. Finally, when he refused to submit, he was beaten into unconsciousness. After several days of such harassment, Bucher was informed that all his men would be shot unless he agreed to sign a "confession." He did so because, he says, he felt that North Korean officers were "animals" who would not hesitate to carry out the threat.

Training in how to torture prisoners is part of a Communist technique and has long been used to frighten citizens who show the slightest signs of disobeying the edicts of the dictatorship regime.

The rest of the world can do much to teach the Communists that this doesn't help them gain either the respect or the cooperation of other nations. International law requires that prisoners be given humane treatment.

North Korea has not proved that the *Pueblo* was inside her 12-mile limit, but certainly it will be hard for anyone to show that veering a mile or two from the prescribed line deserves the punishment accorded to the men on the *Pueblo*. What they saw from a 13-mile position as contrasted with 11 miles or even three—which has been the customary territorial limit—was surely nothing that could threaten the safety of North Korea to the point where such stern measures were necessary.

Some day North Korea will need the friendship of free peoples as it emerges from an era of tyranny and despotism, but be-

tween now and such a time the American people will be wondering whether any of the sensible human beings north of the 38th parallel will care enough about their own future to persuade the North Korean government to correct the wrong which has been done. Will the proper punishment be administered even belatedly to the officials who have portrayed their country before the world as a nation of savagery and inhumanity?

MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENT PLAN

HON. JAMES G. FULTON

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 30, 1969

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following article by Marshall McNeil which appeared in the January 29, 1969, edition of the Washington Daily News:

MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENT PLAN

(By Marshall McNeil)

In a last-minute gesture to Israel, ex-President Johnson took the first step toward the imaginative but practical Eisenhower-Strauss plan to promote peace between the Arabs and Jews.

Congress and the Nixon Administration, nevertheless, have a chance now to advance this water-and-power proposal of former President Eisenhower and Adm. Lewis L. Strauss. The plan is given a big push in the report just filed with Mr. Nixon by his special emissary to the Middle East, former Gov. William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Scranton, obviously with the long-standing Eisenhower-Strauss plan in mind, said a massive nuclear-powered undertaking to provide desalted water for irrigation and industrial power would help both Arabs and Jews develop their resources and "go a long way toward solving a very bad situation."

These plants would be financed in part by private interests, with the United States providing the technology and perhaps the nuclear fuel.

Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Strauss—and now Mr. Scranton—see this project as a means of promoting economic co-operation between the Arabs and Jews, feeling that peace in the trouble area must be founded on such mutually helpful and economically sound projects to produce food and energy.

The Senate last year gave its unanimous approval to the idea.

But Mr. Johnson carried in his last budget message these two sentences:

"Legislation is proposed to authorize U.S. participation in a large-scale desalting plant to be constructed in Israel. This project will significantly advance the development of desalting technology."

He sent draft bills to Congress to carry out his proposal, and these have been referred to committees.

Premier Levi Eshkol announced to a political meeting in Jerusalem last week that Mr. Johnson had written him of his request to Congress for a \$40 million grant and an \$18 million loan to construct the desalting plant on the Mediterranean coast of Israel.

The project, as proposed by the Johnson Administration after joint studies by the Israeli and American governments, does not require production of power. It entails, with the use of conventional fuels, production of 40 to 50 million gallons a day of sweet water whose price might preclude its use for irri-

Clearly, from Mr. Johnson's budget statement, his Administration was interested in the Israeli project as a means of testing the

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

January 29, 1969

Nation's uniform, and he has had to stand up under the endless tragedies of the war in Vietnam more than any other American. He has known the personal impact of this war as well as its impact on our Nation, and I think it was highly appropriate that, by coincidence, the honorees at this ceremony included a member of an Air Force military airlift unit and a marine major.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of President Johnson's remarks be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion of this statement.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT THE CEREMONY FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR TO FOUR MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES, THE EAST ROOM

Members of Congress, Secretary Resor, Secretary Ignatius, Secretary Brown, distinguished members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, members of the families, ladies and gentlemen.

For the final time during my Presidency this house is graced with the company of the heroes who have scaled heights known only to a very few men in this land.

The courage of the bravest in war is a rare and special quality. It knows no rank or station. Generals and privates have won the Medal of Honor. Riflemen and sailors, pilots and priests have worn it on their breasts.

It has gone to every kind of man that our country has ever produced. They have come from the cities and the farms in every section of our land—from very humble homes and from families of great wealth.

I don't know what there is in this Georgia water, but there is something very special in this ceremony. Two of the recipients today come from the same town in this great State of Georgia. It made me really sorry my grandfather left there, because it gives me such great pride in you gentlemen whose families had been friends even before you entered the service.

We have had workers and scholars, businessmen and professional soldiers. They have lived in different times, fought on different fields. They have demonstrated their bravery many times in different ways, but they have all shared one noble distinction.

Each man heard the call of duty in an hour of hard challenge and each man answered that call with a courage beyond demand.

So now the names of Jackson and Pless, Lassen and Dix are added to this roster of the very brave and the record of their deeds, at the very summit of human testing, will forever now be part of the history of valor.

The words "Above and beyond the call of duty" would never sound again in the world that we want and work for. Never again would war summon the best that men can give.

But when that day comes, there will always be a high place of honor for the men who have bought it—for all the good and gallant fighting men who took their duty as they found it, and discharged it always with a courage of giants.

Such men are with us here today, and we—who owe them and their comrades so much—all stand tall in their presence.

I should say that the thing that has given me more strength, as well as more comfort and confidence, in the five years of responsibility that I have carried, have been our men in uniform—from those distinguished, outstanding members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff down to the lowest sailor or airman, Marine or Army. They have never disappointed me once and they have preserved freedom for us many times with their own blood.

The Secretary will read the citation.

(The citations were read.)

I want, if I may, to meet the members of the families and the members of Congress. The Joint Chiefs are here. We want to thank all of you for coming.

If I may, I would like to have a picture with Mr. Pless and Mr. Jackson. I doubt that there are many towns of under 15,000 population that have produced two Medal of Honor winners in the same day.

I would like to keep this picture among my souvenirs because it happens that one of them is from the 123rd where I have a Loadmaster son-in-law, and the other is in the Marine Corps, that we have represented out there, too.

I want to send the other one to Secretary Rusk, because he is from Georgia.

Long before daylight this morning, I got a call that we were proceeding to an agreement with substantive talks in the Paris negotiations, which would indicate that we are a step nearer peace.

If we are, and we pray that we are, it will be because of men like your great commander, General Westmoreland, and men like you who offered your life to try to bring peace to the entire world.

THE FACTS IN THE "PUEBLO" CASE

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy and thoughtfulness of the distinguished Senator from New York in yielding to me at this point.

It is of utmost importance that all the facts surrounding the capture and loss of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* be known.

But I am not convinced the American people have been given all the facts. And, in one case at least, pertinent information has been removed from the permanent files of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I share the views expressed on the floor of the Senate Tuesday by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator JOHN STENNIS, of Mississippi.

In his usual judicious and able manner, he set in perspective the purpose of the court of inquiry now being conducted in California concerning the loss of the *Pueblo*.

Senator STENNIS feels, and I concur, that it would be impractical for a congressional committee to begin an investigation until the Navy completes its hearings.

But there are many unanswered questions which go far beyond the scope of the Navy inquiry and involve the Department of Defense and foreign policy. One such question is—why was no effort made to go to the aid of the *Pueblo*?

During the weekend, I reviewed the testimony of then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, given before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 1, of last year.

The U.S.S. *Pueblo* had been captured the previous week and the committee was interrogating Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler on the *Pueblo* capture, and this question was raised.

The facts are these, as given the Armed Services Committee by top Defense Department officials on February 1, 1968:

The *Pueblo* at 10:50 a.m., Korean time, on January 23, 1968, reported that two North Korean ships had made passes at her at about 2:25 p.m. She reported that she had had 18 additional con-

tacts during the preceding night, the closest at 3,000 yards.

The *Pueblo* was not boarded until 13:28—1:28 p.m.—on the 23d. Boarding was not completed and the *Pueblo* did not come to a complete stop until 14:32, almost 4 hours after she radioed that she was in trouble and had been in trouble since 12:25 the previous day.

According to General Wheeler's testimony, the Navy requested help and the final decision not to intervene was made by the Commander of the Fifth Air Force in Japan, the aircraft being under his control.

There were U.S. aircraft in substantial numbers at bases in Japan, only 40 minutes flying time from the *Pueblo*. The planes were combat ready.

Indicative of the public's difficulty in obtaining an answer to this and other questions, I cite a personal experience from these same hearings.

During the testimony, I called to the attention of Secretary of Defense McNamara the widely published statement by a high Japanese official that U.S. aircraft in Japan could not have been sent to the aid of the *Pueblo* without the consent of the Japanese government.

I asked Secretary McNamara to comment on the accuracy of that statement. The Secretary responded.

When the official transcript was sent to the Defense Department, the Department marked my question and the Secretary's answer as a part of the testimony which could not be made public because of its diplomatic sensitivity. When I learned of this a few weeks later, I protested this censorship.

The reason I raise the question now is that in studying Saturday the complete testimony in the committee files—the committee's permanent copy—I find that I put 10 questions to Secretary McNamara, and that one of the 10 including his reply has been entirely scissored out of the report by the Department of Defense.

The committee clerk tells me that this is the only time during his 22 years with the committee that he has known material to be deleted by scissors from the permanent committee report. The normal procedure is to mark in red those portions of testimony which cannot be published, but the report itself remains as a permanent file in the committee vault.

As it is, the Secretary's reply to an apparently significant and vital question is written on air, unavailable for committee study as if attempts to piece together the tangled facts of the *Pueblo* incident.

I feel security deletions are necessary at times and justified. I think it is important that all military information, all information that could be of value and of importance to the enemy, be deleted from any testimony that is released to the public.

But nothing can justify keeping this information from the review of the congressional committee charged with that responsibility.

I feel it is important also that the public be given all information that it can be given without giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

January 29, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

I feel the Congress and the American people are entitled to more facts than have been made available up to now.

Therefore, I urge a full hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee at the conclusion of the Navy's own inquiry. This hearing should not be limited to the facts in the *Pueblo* case, but it should also consider the broader questions which that incident has raised.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at this point in the RECORD an editorial from the Staunton (Va.) *Leader* of Sunday, January 26, captioned "Where Lies the Blame" be inserted.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHERE LIES THE BLAME?

Fear that the Navy would make Comdr. Lloyd M. Bucher the goat of the *Pueblo*'s seizure has probably been augmented by the statement to him at the inquiry being held at Coronado, Calif., that he may be court-martialed on a charge of disobedience of orders. The specification would be, Navy counsel declared, that he failed to resist the attack by North Korean gunboats and boarders.

The regulation cited to Comdr. Bucher reads: "The commanding officer shall not permit his command to be searched by any person representing a foreign state, nor permit any of the personnel under his command to be removed from the command by such person, so long as he has the power to resist."

That Comdr. Bucher could be charged under this regulation is, as the record now stands, a ridiculous assertion.

Evidence that the *Pueblo* had only two .50 cal. machine guns, mounted in exposed positions and which Bucher testified malfunctioned in tests, is unrefuted. Surrounded by a squadron of Communist naval craft, at least one of which opened fire to cover boarders, what chance would the little U.S. ship have had to resist successfully? To attempt it would have resulted in what military men term "an unnecessary effusion of blood"—the blood of the crew.

The *Pueblo* skipper, from evidence adduced so far and from investigation prior to the release of the crew after nearly a year's imprisonment and abuse, did the best he could. Having been denied "destruct" equipment for the electronic spying system aboard, adequate equipment for quick destruction of codes and files and armament with which to fight effectively, he destroyed what he could and surrendered in order to save his men. His statements that it would have taken 2½ hours to scuttle and only a few minutes for the icy water to kill his men had he been able to scuttle have not been refuted.

Why air support was not given the *Pueblo* immediately after Bucher radioed that he was being attacked has never been satisfactorily explained. Lt. Col. J. Addison Hagan, a retired Marine officer, made the following statement in a letter to a Washington newspaper a few days ago:

"Adm. Sharpe issued orders to Vice Adm. Bringle to use the amount of force necessary to 'cut and return' the *Pueblo* on the day of its capture. However, Adm. Sharpe's orders were countermanded, and, consequently, the *Pueblo* was not allowed to resist the North Koreans. When the *Pueblo* was attacked on Jan. 23, 1968, planes were dispatched from South Korea and arrived in exactly 37 minutes. The pilot saw the *Pueblo* being attacked and boarded but received a radio message not to attack."

Col. Hagan, if the Board of Inquiry wants to fix responsibility for the *Pueblo*'s loss, ought to be summoned to testify as

to the sources of his information. The suspicion that the *Pueblo* was sacrificed by a top level decision not to risk resumption of the Korean War because of our involvement in Vietnam and the Tet offensive then in progress there, will not down.

The American people are entitled to know the facts, which at this stage cannot damage us militarily. Court-martialing Comdr. Bucher for the surrender, or for his "confession" and savage beatings and mental terror in which fear for the lives of his men was a principal constituent, would on the record as it now exists be a further disgrace to this country. Let's not forget that our government itself "confessed" in order to free Bucher and his men.

THE ABM: UNSAFE AT ANY PRICE

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, the decision to authorize and appropriate funds for the deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system was a tragic mistake. The great weight of the evidence presented indicates that the Sentinel ABM would not be effective against an all-out missile attack.

Eminent scientists such as Dr. Jerome Wiesner, former adviser to President Kennedy, Dr. George Kistiakowsky, adviser to President Eisenhower, Herbert York, Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Ralph Lapp, and others have all urged delay of this project. It is my opinion that our efforts should be directed toward further research and development before we begin constructing an ABM that may not ever perform properly.

Later on in this session, the Senate will again reconsider the merits of this project. It is my hope that the majority of my colleagues will thoughtfully reconsider their position and vote to delay deployment.

In a recent article by my colleague Senator McGovern appearing in the February issue of the *Progressive* magazine, the ABM issue is carefully discussed. I think this excellent article is worthy of careful examination and therefore I ask unanimous consent that it be reprinted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ABM: UNSAFE AT ANY PRICE

(By Senator GEORGE S. MCGOVERN)

(NOTE.—Senator GEORGE S. MCGOVERN, South Dakota Democrat, was re-elected last fall after his unsuccessful candidacy for the Democratic Presidential nomination. He was a bomber pilot in World War II. A professor of history and government before he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1956, Senator McGovern was the first director of the Food for Peace program and is the author of two books, "War Against Want" and "A Time of War/A Time of Peace.")

The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a remarkable device. It is remarkable for its technology, its speed, its acceleration, its complexity. It is even more remarkable for the effect it may have on the course of Soviet-American relations during the next ten years, and for its capacity to devour enormous sums of public funds allocated to the military sector of the nation. Most remarkable of all, our country may spend many billions of dollars on an ABM deployment before the system has been carefully evaluated and during the precise period that we most need to scale down

the arms race and the hazards of the arms race. Let me state at the outset my own firm

conviction that the building of an ABM system by the United States would be a national blunder of major proportions—militarily, economically, and politically. I am convinced that the proposed ABM would be obsolete and ineffective before it could be constructed; that for far less money than the cost of any ABM system, the Soviets could and would place us in an even more vulnerable position by increasing their offensive capacity.

No one has more clearly summarized the case against the ABM than former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who said on September 18, 1967: "Every ABM system that is now feasible involves firing defensive missiles at incoming offensive warheads in an effort to destroy them. But what many commentators on this issue overlook is that any such system can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them. And this is the whole crux of the nuclear action-reaction phenomenon." And, added McNamara, "Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system throughout the United States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage. It is futile for each of us to spend \$4 billion, \$40 billion, or \$400 billion—and at the end of all the spending, and at the end of all the deployment, and at the end of all the effort, to be relatively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are now."

I believe that an ABM deployment by the United States would actually decrease our security, not only because it could be easily penetrated by the Soviets, but because it would lead to a further escalation of the arms race and a worsening of Soviet-American relations. Beyond these considerations, the allocation of many billions of dollars of tax funds to the ABM would threaten our national security by depriving us of funds desperately needed to cope with the explosive social and economic needs of our own society and of a world in ferment around us.

It is my considered judgment that last year the Johnson Administration yielded to the pressure of the military-industrial complex in agreeing to deploy a "thin" ABM system supposedly against the Chinese. This was not a security decision based on a broad view of national and international priorities; it was rather a surrender to mounting political pressure from military-minded Senators, Congressmen, generals, and arms manufacturers. All of this was fed by the mistaken impression that it is possible to calculate national security in mathematical terms related exclusively to the size of our defensive and offensive armament.

As Dr. Jerome Wiesner, former science adviser to the President, has reminded us on several occasions, the political pressure on the President and the Defense Department to deploy the ABM was not new. For more than a decade, the Pressure had been directed at President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and President Johnson. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy wisely resisted the demands for the Nike-Zeus and then the Nike-X ABMs. If they had surrendered, we would have wasted an estimated \$30 billion on a system that would now be completely obsolete and worthless. I am confident that the system now being pressed will prove equally obsolete and equally ineffective but even more costly and dangerous than the earlier system.

I believe that when President Johnson finally yielded last year to the ABM deployment pressure, he committed what could prove to be, next to the Vietnam escalation, the most costly blunder of his Administration. President-elect Nixon could perform better. The American people and to the cause of peace if he would

with emergency funding programs for many of our farmers later this year—when it may be largely avoided by simply passing this bill now.

"PUEBLO": ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURE

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, January 29, 1969

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, many of my constituents have phoned me while home in the district or written me after reading and hearing press accounts of the naval board of inquiry's investigation of the *Pueblo* affair. I find there is considerable misunderstanding among the general public as to just what the issues are. It's quite natural, I think, for emotions to be aroused when one such as Commander Bucher, who has undergone such a trying experience, finds himself put on the pan, so to speak, and asked to undergo the kind of interrogation that is reported from the naval board of inquiry. I have made the point that from what disclosures have been made thus far, it would seem that Commander Bucher is headed for a court-martial, but I certainly don't mean by saying this that I believe this is what he deserves by any stretch of the imagination.

The Navy inquiry is limited in scope to matters wholly within the jurisdiction of the Navy, but it's quite possible that other branches of the Department of Defense shared in responsibility for the policies and conditions under which the ship operated. I don't think this will ever be disclosed fully unless we have an appropriate committee from the Congress conduct our own independent investigation and airing of the facts. Ultimately blame will have to be fixed, but it is quite obvious to me at this juncture that we cannot permit Commander Bucher alone to shoulder this responsibility. It is quite understandable that the Navy should want to know from a captain of one of its ships why he turned it over to a foreign power without firing a shot and what options were available to Commander Bucher, notwithstanding his being shortchanged topside so far as defensive weapons were concerned, air cover, sea support, and adequate destruct equipment aboard for disposing of the secret and sensitive equipment aboard. Over and above this concern, we as Members of Congress want to know and I think the American public is deserving of knowing just who were those responsible in varying degrees for nakedly exposing this ship and making those decisions which obviously led to this most sorry chapter in our naval history.

Mr. Chuck Dancy, editor of the Peoria Journal Star and himself a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves, makes a good point in his editorial of January 27 entitled: "*Pueblo*: Organizational Failure" and I am including the full text of that editorial at this point in the Record:

"PUEBLO": ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURE (By C. L. Dancy)

The bystander focus on the court of inquiry into the *Pueblo* incident is naturally and instinctively on the personality, the personal trials, and the performance of Commander Bucher—but that is not the key role of the court.

The key role, and one suspects the major problem in this event, is not an individual or personal assessment, but a review of the organizational structure and over-all systems used. A system which failed, whether Commander Bucher failed in any respect or not in his place in that system.

His place in it put him in a pretty horrible situation which was hardly his sole responsibility. Nor was it his task alone to extricate himself.

As far as the Commander, himself, is concerned, the only thing that he has testified to which is professionally shocking is his comment that he never thought about or considered the possibility of being attacked.

(This is belied somewhat by his request for "destruct" equipment.)

SHOULD DESTRUCT AUTOMATICALLY

Nevertheless, it was a strange answer, because in military doctrine which must certainly be taught as basic to every officer the very first automatic responsibility of every unit commander is to provide for the "local security" of his unit.

One suspects that the larger question may be, however, how his security was to be protected within the over-all military setup in the areas where he operated.

And at this point it appears that nothing whatever existed of that nature.

It would begin to look as if the favorite game of the "Whiz Kids" who took charge of the admirals and generals in recent years was to bypass the regular military establishment and play with intelligence operations and special operations themselves.

If such was again the case in the operations of the *Pueblo*, the very people who might have and should have been responsible for both its operations and its protection were left on the outside of the whole deal, in no position to plan, to be prepared, or to accept responsibility for a prompt reaction.

SYSTEM CONFUSED

Washington is a very long way off, and unless the area people have a responsible part to play it is already too late to prepare systems when something happens. That preparation needs to have been made in advance.

It is hardly a coincidence that confusion has surrounded two ships of the *Pueblo* type, the *Pueblo* and the *Liberty*, at opposite ends of the world, with tragic consequences in both cases.

One cannot help but suspect that there is something basically wrong with the organization structure and systems by which these special operations are controlled—and that it arises from the recent tendency of civilian brain boys to enjoy the freedom of bypassing professional military establishment and "go it alone."

This is a dangerous practice indeed and unfair to its victims. It should have been abandoned after the Bay of Pigs—where it began. It seems to be a continuing disaster.

LAW AND ORDER AND THE SCHOOLS

HON. WILLIAM D. FORD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, January 29, 1969

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I am including the full text of this editorial at this point in the Record:

reluctance to speak out on major issues. The consistency with which he insisted on "telling it like it is" was, in my judgment, a very refreshing quality during the years he headed the Office of Education.

I was pleased to read in the New York Times recently that Dr. Howe's departure from Federal service has not prevented him from continuing to speak his mind on the issues with which he is familiar. I refer to a letter to the editor of the Times of January 19 in which Dr. Howe gives the new Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare some good advice on the subject of law and order as it relates to school desegregation.

For the benefit of my colleagues who may not have read Dr. Howe's letter, I include it at this point in the Record:

[From the New York Times, Jan. 19, 1969]

FINCH'S ALTERNATIVES

ASHLAND, N.H.,

January 11, 1969.

To the Editor:

Your Jan. 11 issue reports that Secretary-designate Robert H. Finch of Health, Education and Welfare is considering alternatives to the withholding of Federal funds in school districts where desegregation is an issue.

Certainly every effort should be made by Federal officials to work with local school authorities to desegregate the schools without depriving children of the benefit of Federal programs. The outgoing Administration has made much effort and has achieved some progress in bringing about voluntary compliance with the law.

But the record clearly shows that voluntary compliance is not likely to be successful unless backed up by the willingness to use the legal procedure to withhold funds in places where racial discrimination continues. Indeed, the mere suggestion by Mr. Finch that he is considering using other methods will almost certainly encourage those currently practicing discrimination in the schools to continue it until he clarifies his views.

Mr. Finch needs to remember some facts as he makes up his mind about these matters:

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act requires the withholding of Federal funds from any grantee practicing discrimination on the basis of race; even if Federal funds are withheld, school districts have a constitutional obligation enforceable in the courts to cease discriminatory practice; the courts have firmly upheld the principles embodied in the H.E.W. guidelines for school desegregation.

The incoming Secretary of H.E.W. can do the new Administration and the cause of law and order a service by making it clear that he intends to enforce the law, even if it is not very popular in some quarters. If the law is not enforced by those whose duty it is to do so, what can we say to those who choose to disobey laws which are not agreeable to them?

HAROLD HOWE 2d.

"HOOSIER," A WORD WITH A HISTORY ALL AROUND IT

HON. JOHN T. MYERS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, January 29, 1969

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Speaker, the term "Hoosier" is one of the most distinctive of our State's nicknames. As a native of the Hoosier State, I am well aware of the